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Book Review

Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More
Effective Global Agreements
By Lawrence E. Susskind
Oxford University Press, 1994, 201 pp.
REVIEWED BY THOMAS
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Thomas Drennen is Visiting Scholar in the Programon Ethics
and Public Life, Cornell University, and Resource Economist in the
Energy Policy and Planning Department, Sandia National
Laboratories. Dr.Drennen has a B.S. in NuclearEngineeringfrom
the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, an MA. in PublicAffairs
from the University of Minnesota, and a Ph.D. in Resource
Economics from Cornell. He is a specialist in resource and
environmental economics.

Negotiations toward reducing the threat of global warming are
proceeding along a two-step process: the negotiation of the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC),' laying out basic principles and
guidelines for action, followed by regular meetings of the Parties with the
expectation that protocols will emerge that strengthen the initial agreement.
This two-step process has become the generally accepted method for
negotiating environmental agreements, following the success of the Vienna
Convention on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,2 and the
The Vienna
subsequent Montreal Protocol' and its Amendments.
Convention did not even mention chlorofluorocarbons, the main culprit in
I.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849

(1992).
2. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.1.A.S. No. 11097,
26 I.L.M. 1520 (1987).
3. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1541 (1987).
4. See Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537 (1991); and Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL. Pro.4/15
(1992).
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ozone destruction. It did begin a process which, although criticized initially
by many for its weakness, led to one of the few successful environmental
protection agreements.
Largely because of this success, I and many others were cautiously
optimistic with the signing of the FCCC. The Convention garnered
widespread support, with 153 member countries signing the agreement at the
1992 Earth Summit. It mandated that the Parties continue meeting at
regular intervals to monitor progress to date towards achieving the goals of
the FCCC. It also increased the transparency of the process through the
requirement of national reports and plans. For example, the FCCC, in
article 4.2.a, requires that Appendix I countries (basically, developed
countries including many of the Republics of the former Soviet Union)
adopt national policies that detail how these countries will attempt to
achieve the goal of returning greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels to 1990
levels by the year 2000. Even though these countries are not obligated to
actually achieve 1990 emission levels, or to hold them at that level, the
publication of the national reports will allow for public scrutiny of goals and
accomplishments and should eventually lead to more meaningful
commitments to GHG reduction.
In his book, Lawrence Susskind refers to those optimistic about the
FCCC as pragmatists, finding good in what others (the idealists) decried as
a dismal failure caused by the vast majority of countries caving in to the
demands of a small number of powerful countries for the sake of getting
something done in time for the 1992 Earth Summit. The idealists believe
that no agreement would have been better than a weak agreement. Even
though the pragmatists remain cautiously optimistic, they too feel a sense of
disappointment with the final agreement.
Susskind argues that without some basic changes in the negotiating
process, this type of agreement is probably the best that can emerge. Unlike
other proposals, Susskind's approach would not require a major overhaul of
the United Nations (U.N.) or that countries give up any of their sovereignty.
Instead, Susskind relies on common-sense changes to the basic negotiating
processes that would eliminate some of the existing problems that currently
lead us to "a lowest common denominator approach to treaty making."
Problems that he identifies with the existing process include the following:
the requirement for consensus among 170 different member countries; the
inability to deal with the scientific uncertainty inherent in complex
environmental problems; the difficulty in establishing effective monitoring
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and compliance regimes given financial and sovereignty concerns; and the
free rider problem.
Although Susskind does not limit his focus to any one environmental
problem, for the purpose of this short review, I will summarize Susskind's
proposal and relate it back to the climate change negotiations. First,
however, I should note that substantial progress has occurred toward the
second phase of negotiations on the FCCC since the publication of
Susskind's book. Most importantly, the FCCC officially entered into force
on March 21, 1994, ninety days after receipt of the fiftieth ratification. As
of July 1994, eighty countries had ratified the FCCC.5 As mandated by
the FCCC, the Parties will again convene at the First Conference of the
Parties (CoP) in Berlin, March 28 to April 7, 1995. The goal at that
meeting will be to begin negotiation on subsequent protocols that may
contain more concrete commitments. While this progress leaves room for
optimism that the process is working, there are equally disturbing signs that
countries will not be able to meet even the voluntary commitments of the
FCCC. For example, the United States released a comprehensive plan for
meeting its commitments in October 1993.6 However, recent forecasts by
the Energy Information Administration7 project that carbon dioxide (CO 2)
emissions in 1995 will exceed the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP)
projections for that year by about the same amount (65 million metric tons
carbon (mmtc)) as is specified for total CO 2 reductions in the CCAP for the
year 2000 (66 mmtc).
Susskind recommends that all future negotiations follow a three-stage
process. While maintaining some of the flexibility of the current process,
Susskind's approach would set a specific time schedule for each phase,
making negotiations more predictable. Another major change would be
doing away with the current requirement for unanimity in terms of approval
of treaty language. Under the current system, any one country can request
that a word, phrase, or whole article be bracketed, meaning that it is
unacceptable as currently written. This process allows just one country to
block passage of any or all of the treaty text.
5. The United States ratified the FCCC on October 15, 1992, becoming the fourth country to do
so. United Nations, Convention Countdown, CLIMATE CHANGE BULLETIN, no. 4, 1994, at 7.
6.

WILLIAM CLINTON & AL GORE, THE CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN (1993) [hereinafter

CCAP].
7.
OUTLOOK:

ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SHORT TERM ENERGY
QUARTERLY PROJECTIONS,

DOE/EIA-0202(94/2Q) (1994).
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Under Susskind's proposal, Stage I negotiations would commence
whenever fifty percent of U.N. Member Countries agreed that a threat
existed that might require international action. The goal of Stage I
negotiations would be a document that defined the scope of the threat and
that listed key principles to be applied in the formation of a response. As
examples, Susskind lists "the precautionary principle," the "principle of
polluter pays," and "the principle of additionality of aid."8 This first stage
would have a six month time limit.
If Stage I were successful in terms of producing a final document, Stage
II of negotiations would commence within one year of the initiation of Stage
I and would last a maximum of twenty-four months. It seems that what
Susskind is really proposing in this next stage has two separate components.
The goal of the first part would be the negotiation of general commitments,
specific commitments, financial arrangements, institutional arrangements,
and reporting or monitoring requirements. Susskind recommends that other
details, including mechanisms for ratification, dispute resolution, etc., be
standardized ahead of time to cover all negotiations. If fifty percent of
member countries that began Stage II negotiations agreed on a draft text,
negotiations would move directly into the protocol phase. If at least fifty
percent did not approve of a text within the mandated twenty-four month
period, then negotiations would end for at least two years. The purpose of
this time limit would be to terminate unproductive negotiations and to instill
some specific deadlines for parties to work towards.
The second part of Stage II negotiations is Susskind's solution for
dealing with uncertainty. During this phase, countries would negotiate
multiple protocols, often with contradictory wordings, with specific triggers
for each protocol. Hence, rather than making vague statements such as the
need to conduct additional research or to share scientific and technical data,
countries would agree ahead of time on actions that they would take if a
certain triggering event occurred. Of course, gaining agreement on what
might trigger a specific action could turn out to be a negotiating nightmare,
But Susskind is basically correct: there will always be some uncertainty,
and this requirement would force negotiators to decide what action they
would take for a specified level of change. Of course, one valid concern
with Susskind's proposal is that if the specified triggering events are far
8. LAWRENCE SusSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY:
GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 143 (1994).
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enough in the future, it may be too late to take appropriate action to counter
many undesirable effects.
Susskind does not provide examples of triggering events. In the case
of global warming, if negotiators had followed Susskind's approach, they
might have specified varying degrees of reduction based on some specific
triggering event. For example, one protocol might have mandated a twenty
percent reduction in each country's CO2 emissions if some international
group, such as the World Meteorological Organization, concludes before
2005 that the earth's temperature has increased one degree celsius over preindustrial levels. A second protocol might specify a ten percent reduction
in CO 2 emissions if atmospheric concentrations of CO 2 increased at a rate
greater than 1.5 percent for three consecutive years. A third protocol might
specify a carbon tax schedule if global efforts failed to hold 2010 emissions
from fossil fuels to less than seven billion metric tons. Such protocols would
clearly involve different degrees of difficulty in specifying the triggering
event; in the three cases proposed here, the first would be far more difficult
to measure than the other two, but would definitely signal the onset of
global warming, something that the other two do not do.
The final stage of negotiations, Stage III, would focus on annual reviews
of reporting and monitoring results and could lead to a tightening of
requirements. Susskind proposes that this stage last three years following
signing of the Stage II treaty and that it occur only if two-thirds of the Stage
II signatories vote to initiate it. Otherwise, the process would terminate for
twenty-four months and then begin again if fifty percent of all U.N.
members agree to restart the process. The final goal of Stage III would be
a tightened treaty and a revised set of protocols, again each with a clear
trigger.
Susskind suggests that had countries followed this three-step approach
to climate change negotiations, it might have been possible for several
European countries to reconcile their differences with the United States. For
example, Susskind notes that many European countries were holding out for
what he calls a Stage III type treaty, with specific commitments, full
funding, and elaborate reporting and monitoring requirements. 9 The United
States, on the other hand, was more interested in a Stage I type treaty.
Because the United States was insistent on either this or nothing, the

9.

Id. at 145.

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:345

Europeans had to give in because there was no more time for negotiations.
Susskind argues that the three-step approach would avoid this type of
confrontation by setting up a predictable schedule and allowing movement
toward the best possible treaty or package of treaties. Of course, it is
unlikely that even under Susskind's approach countries would move forward
without participation by key countries, such as the United States, since
without their concurrence, the financial commitments to carry through would
be lacking. Still, Susskind's approach would avoid the all-or-nothing quality
of current negotiations.
Throughout his book, Susskind argues for a more open role for what he
calls non-governmental interests (NGI).'0 While these groups did play an
active role in behind-the-scenes lobbying during climate change negotiations,
ground rules for these groups vary from treaty negotiation to treaty
negotiation, requiring that considerable time be spent establishing rules for
their inclusion each time. Susskind suggests that their inclusion be specified
ahead of time to include a right to be involved in negotiations, but that they
should not have voting rights. While some will undoubtedly disagree,
Susskind argues that the non-governmental organizations' (NGO) influence
at the Rio Earth Summit was, at times, counterproductive. For example, he
notes that the official NGO forum, the Citizen's Forum, was held miles
away from the main negotiations and resulted in counter versions to each
official Framework Convention, eroding public confidence in the official
agreements.
Susskind also proposes a sensible solution to the ongoing problem of
compliance with international environmental agreements. He concludes that
given the importance of the sovereignty principle and the unwillingness of
the U.N. to use force to achieve compliance, "it is important to do more to
convince each nation that its self-interest is best served by complying with
all treaties it has signed."" He then proposes the establishment of groups
within each country, linked together internationally, that would monitor
compliance and be able to shame noncomplying nations into changing their
behavior. He goes on to fashion these groups after Amnesty International,

10. Unlike an NGO, Susskind's NGIs also include business interests in addition to environmental,
religious, or academic groups.
1I. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 113.
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referring to them as the Green Amnesty International (GAI) 1 2 "GAI
reports," argues Susskind, "would play a role in treaty tightening, and all of
this would be done without any further encroachment on national
sovereignty than has already occurred in the human rights field."13
The proposals in Susskind's book stem from his participation in the
"Salzburg Initiative," an international assembly of diplomats, scientists,
negotiation experts, international relations theorists, development specialists,
and environmental activists that met in 1990 in Salzburg, Austria, to draft
proposals for reforming the negotiation process prior to the 1992 Earth
Summit. He notes that although the conclusions of the Salzburg Initiative
were presented to world leaders and policymakers, change did not occur
prior to the Earth Summit.
Hopefully, some of the excellent
recommendations of this Initiative, as further elaborated on by Susskind, will
lead to future reform.

12. Others have mentioned similar groups. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth as Eggshell
Victim: A Global Perspective on Domestic Regulation, 102 YALE L.J. 2107, 2121 (1993).
13. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 117.

